The game-theoretic solution to certain job assignment problems allows the interests of agents on the same side of the market (e.g. firms or workers) to be simultaneously maximized. This is shown to follow from the lattice structure of the set of stable outcomes. However it is shown that in a more general class of problems the optimality results persist, but the lattice structures do not. Thus this paper raises as many questions as it answers.
1. Introduction. Game theory concerns situations involving conflicting interests of multiple decision makers. Because multiple objectives cannot in general be simultaneously maximized, the optimization results found in other areas of operations research are largely absent from game theory, and the theoretical analysis of games focuses not on identifying "optimal" outcomes, but primarily on identifying outcomes that are in some appropriate sense stable. It is therefore noteworthy that in an important class of games associated with two-sided markets, the differing objectives of (competing) agents on the same side of the market can be simultaneously maximized on the set of stable outcomes. In such market games, therefore, an optimal stable outcome can be identified for each side of the market. This kind of optimization has not been observed in any other nontrivial class of games. This paper explores the underlying structure which allows such optimization to occur. It wOl be shown that, in all but one of the models in which such optimal stable outcomes have been shown to exist, this optimality is closely related to the algebraic structure of the set of stable outcomes. Specifically, in these models the preferences of the agents impose in a natural way a lattice structure on the set of stable outcomes, and the optimal stable outcomes for the two sides of the market are the maximum and minimum elements of the lattice. However in the remaining model, which is also the most general, it will be shown that this natural lattice structure no longer occurs. There thus remains an open problem: to identify some property of these models which explains the existence of optimal stable outcomes in the most general case.
2. Overrfew vi tbe litontiBC. The first model of the kind considered here was introduced by Gale and Shapley (1962) , who studied two-sided "marriage markets" consisting of two kinds of heterogeneous agents (e.g., firms and workers) each of whom has its own preferences over potential matches with agents of the other kind.
Viewed as an institution designed to achieve a mutually satisfactory matching of firms and workers, any market of this type serves to advance the conwnon interests of firms and workers wishing to be matched, and to resolve the conflicting interests of firms, who are in competition for desirable workers, and of workers, who are in competition for desirable firms. It is thus surprising to find that this overall pattern of common and conflicting interests is reversed when attention is confined to the set of outcomes that are stable in the sense that no pair of agents both prefer to be matched to each other rather than to their assigned matches. (The set of stable outcomes constitutes the core of this game.) Specifically, when agents in the simple symmetric model studied by Gale and Shapley are not indifferent between potential matches, there exists a "firm-optimal" outcome in the core which every firm agrees is the best core outcome, and a corresponding "worker-optimal" core outcome which is best for every worker.' In addition, it is straightforward to show in this model that the optimal core outcome for one side of the market is the worst outcome in the core for every agent on the other side of the market (cf. Knuth 1976).F irm and worker-optimal stable outcomes have also been shown to exist in a number of related models. Shapley and Shubik (1972) and Thompson (1980) considered transferable-utility models in which all outcomes can be evaluated in terms of monetary payoffs, and Crawford and Knoer (1981) considered a nontransferable utility model of a labor market in which salaries and job descriptions, as well as job assignments, are determined endogenously. (This last model is a generalization of Gale and Shapley's marriage market.) These models treat firms and workers in a symmetrical way, and assume that the number of employees required by each firm is fixed, and that firms have separable preferences over workers. Kelso and Crawford (1982) generalized the model of Crawford and Knoer by dropping the assumption that firms have fixed needs for workers and separable preferences. In this model workers may work for only one firm, but firms may employ any number of workers, and each firm has preferences over sets of employees, salaries, and job descriptions. Kelso and Crawford showed that, when firms regard individual workers as substitutes in a certain sense, and when agents are not indifferent between matches in the core and other potential matches, there is an outcome in the core that is simultaneously the best core outcome for every firm. Since firms and workers are not symmetric in this model, Kelso and Crawford's treatment left open the question of whether there exists a dual core outcome which is best for all workers.
One result demonstrated in Roth (1984) was that such a worker-optimal outcome does indeed exist, when agents have suitably strict preferences. It was shown that there are firm-optimal and worker-optimal stable outcomes in a more general, completely symmetric model, in which workers may take more than one job, and each worker has preferences over sets of jobs.
The principal purpose of this paper is to explore the reasons behind, and the precise extent of, the surprising pattern of common and conflicting interests exhibited by the various models discussed above. To this end we shall consider three increasingly general models of job matching.
The results for these three models can be briefly described as follows. The first ' For example, consider the simple marriage game (whose agents are "men" and "wcmien") in which all the men happen to rank the same woman as the most desirable match. Then these men disagree about what is the most desirable outcome of the game, since each man prefers an outcome which gives him his first choice (and hence gives other men lower choices, in this example). However when attention is confined to stable outcomes, the men all agr^ which is the best stable outcome. (In particular, in this example any stable outcome must match the most preferred woman with the man she ranks fint, and so flik woman is not an achievable match for any of the other men, in a ccHopetitive marriage maricet whose outeoines are stable.)
These optimal stable outcomes also reflect the two-sided nature of the maiket in a surprising way when the matching process is considered as a noncoopa«tive {^me ia which each agent's pr^eiencxs are unknown to the other agents. See Roth (l%2a) for a discussion of these matters. model considered is a straightforward generalization of the model of Crawford and Knoer.' It will be shown that, in this model, choices between different stable outcomes tum out to have a remarkable "consensus" property. If all the firms, say, are allowed to choose their most preferred workers from the workers assigned to them at two different stable outcomes, then no worker is selected by two different firms, and so the choice results in a feasible outcome, which is itself stable. This consensus property directly implies the existence of firm-optimal and worker-optimal outcomes, and imparts to the set of stable outcomes a lattice structure, in which the common interests of the firms tum out to be directly opposed to the common interests of the workers, in the sense that all firms prefer one stable outcome to another if and only if all workers have the opposite preference. This opposition of interests in tum implies that the optimal stable outcome for one side of the market will be the worst stable outcome for every agent on the other side of the market. (These results extend the similar results for Gale and Shapley's marriage market reported in Knuth (1976) . The same phenomenon occurs in the transferable utility model of Shapley and Shubik (1972) .)
The second model considered is a straightforward generalization of the asymmetric model of Kelso and Crawford. The consensus property of the previous model continues to hold for choices made by firms, and this implies the existence of the firmoptimal stable outcome identified by Kelso and Crawford.
In further investigating the second model, however, we will see that the consensus property fails to hold for choices made by workers, and so cannot be used to explain why a worker-optimal stable outcome nevertheless exists. The common interests of the firms are no longer opposed to those of the workers throughout the stable set in this model, and so this can no longer be used to explain why, nevertheless, the optimal stable outcome for one side of the market still turns out to be the worst for every agent on the other side of the market. Enough of the structure found in the first model remains, however, so that it might appear that only a few pieces are missing from a complete explanation of the polarization of interests in this case also.
However in a version of the symmetric model of Roth (1984b) , it will be shown that no vestige remains of the elaborate structure observed in the previous two models, but firm-and worker-optimal stable outcomes nevertheless exist, and it continues to be the case that the optimal stable outcome for one side of the market is the worst stable outcome for agents on the other side.
3. Three modeb of j^ matdiiog. In each of the models considered here there will be a bipartite graph iN,X) whose set N of nodes is the union of a set Pf' (of workers) indexed by i = 1,. . . , m and a set F (of firms) indexed byy = 1, . . ., n. The finite set of arcs Xii,j) = {xA,..., x^'''''} connecting worker / and firm j represents the job descriptions* at which / might be employed hyj, and the set X of arcs is the union over all ii,j) in FF X F of Xii,j). Denote by Xii) = Uyef ^('-y) and Xij) = \JiewXii,f) the arcs incident to a node i E W OT j E F, respectively. The three models to be considered differ in what constitutes a feasible outcome.
In Model I, a feasible outcome is a subset of / of A' such that for every k in N, \fnXik)\ < 1; i.e. every agent is assigned at most one job.* For any agent k and
The first of these models is also studied in Ritz (1982) , in a form similar to that studied here. *For an arbitrary job d<»cription x^ in X(i,j% we will sometimes refer to s as the gfineralized salary assocaated with tiie job d»crq>tioii, since the worker will later be assumed to prefer s to be high, and the finn will later be assumed to prefer a low s. This is a "generalized" salary since it serves to paranwterize the elements of Xii,JD, w*ich may diffw in dimrasions other than actual salary.
'It w o^ n « diange the rwults if ev«y agent * could be assisted some number q^ of jobs different from 1. so loag as 9^ is fixed and preferences over jobs are separable in the sense that the desirability of a job is not inflwnced by Ac sei of jobs already a^^e d . However this other model is not equivalent to the one studied hoe: see Roth (1985a).
feasible outcome /, the feasible assignment to k at f is fi^ =^ f d Xik), the job description assigned to agent k. (If fi^ = Q then agent k is unmatched at the outcome /.) The set of possible feasible assignments for an agent A: in A' is thus Aik) = {/, I/, C ^(A:) and |/,| = 1, or/, = 0}.
In Model II, a feasible outcome is a subset f of X such that for every / in W, \f n Xii)\ < 1; i.e. every worker is assigned at most one job, but firms may be assigned sets of workers. The feasible assignment at/for an-agent kisf^^fn Xik), so the set of feasible assignments for a worker / in W is Aii) = { / | / C Xii) and | / | = 1, or / = 0} as in Model I, while the set of feasible assignments for a firm y in F is Aij) = {j^. c Xij)\\fj n Xii,j)\ < 1 for all / G W}. That is, a feasible assignment fora firm/ is a set of job descriptions, one for each worker employed by the firm.*
In Model III, a feasible outcome is a subset/of X such that for all (/,/) inWxF, 1/ n Xii,j)\ < 1; i.e. workers may have more than one job and firms more than one employee, but no worker has more than one job description at any firm. For any agent k the feasible assignment atfisf^-fr\ Xik), so the set of feasible assignments for a worker / is A (0 = {/ C Xii) \ | / n Xii, j)\ < 1 for all; E F} and for a firm /, A ij)
In each of the models, every agent k has a strict preference-i.e. a rank-orderingover his (finite) set Aik) of feasible assignments.^ For any elements/, and g^^ of Aik), let f^Pj^gi^ denote that agent k prefers/, to g^, and for any subset 5 of Xik), let Cj. (5) denote agent k's most preferred element of Aik) that is a subset of S, i.e. Q ( 5 ) is agent it's most preferred choice from among all feasible subsets of S.
A feasible outcome/ is defined to be stable if/, = Q ( / , ) for all k in N, and if no worker-firm pair (/, j) and job description Xy E Xii, j) exist such that (i) Xy E Ciif U (xy)) and C,(/. U {xy})PJr, and (ii) Xy E Cjifj U {Xy}) and Cjifj U {Xy})Pjfj. The requirement that/, = C,(/,) implies that no^gent can improve his assignment by declining some job description assigned to him, while (i) and (ii) imply that no worker i and firm / can agree on a job description that would improve both their assignments.Ŵ ithout further conditions on agents' preferences, the set of stable outcomes can sometimes be empty in Models II and III (but not in Model I). In what follows, we will therefore assume that agents' preferences obey the following two conditions.'
Generalized salary condition. For any (i, j) in W X F let f and g he feasible outcomes such that/ differs from g, and^ differs from gj only in the job description of worker / at firm;, with x,^ ^ff^ fj and x,^ G g^ D gj. Then/P,g, and gjPJj if and only
ifq>r.
Note that this condition is satisfied trivially in any example in which there is only one job description at which any worker-firm pair can be matched, i.e. if Xii,j) contains at most one element for any / and /. The polarization of interests discussed here, which was first observed in such examples, therefore does not depend on this condition, which serves to make the set of Pareto optimal contracts between a given firm and worker independent of the job assignments agreed to by the firm and other workers, or the worker and other firms.
'TTiere is no loss of generality in assuming that a worker can have no nwre than one job d«cription at a given firm, since the set of job dracriptioas can be e n l a r^ to iiudude any feaabk combinatMHi of jobs as a single job description. Substitutability condition^^. For any k in N, l e t / , = C,(/, U g,). Then any Xy i n / , is contained in C , ( g , U {Xy}).
This latter assumption states that workers and firms regard each other more as substitutes than as complements, in the sense that if a worker, say, is a desirable employee at job description Xy in a firm's feasible assignment/, then he remains a desirable employee at that job description, even in a less desirable group of co-workers. Note that this condition is trivially satisfied in Model I and by workers' preferences in Model II, since feasible assignments and choice sets there are always singletons. Substitutability has the following immediate implication.
LENfMA 1. For substitutable preferences, let XyECjifjU gj). Then XyECjigjU {Xy}).
PROOF. Since the choice function C, arises from a binary preference relation, Cjifj ^ gj)= CjiCjifj U gj) U g). Using tiiis more cumbersome expression, the lemma now foUows directiy from the definition of substitutability.
The polarization of inta«sts.
The following theorem sets the stage for the subsequent investigation of the detailed structure of the set of stable outcomes.
THEOREM 1 (Roth 1984 Since Model III generalizes Model II which in tum generalizes Model I, Theorem 1 applies to all three models.'^ However we will s^ that the structure of the set of stable outcomes does not generalize from Model I to III in a straightforward way.
4.1. Polarization of interests in Model I. In the introduction, we referred to a consensus property for choices between different stable outcomes. This can be formally stated as follows.
THEOREM 2 (Consensus property for firms). In Model I let f and g be stable outcomes. There is a feasible outcome h defined by hj = Cjifj U gj) for all j in F, and h, -hj for every i in W such that hj C Xii, j) for some j in F, and /i, = 0 for all other i in W. Furthermore, this outcome h is itself stable. This theorem will be proved in the analysis of Model II, where it also holds. (Note that the fact that h is feasible means that no two firms choose the same worker.) Theorem 2 and the symmetry between firms and workers in Model I immediately imply that there is a symmetric consensus property for workers.
'"Preference which possess this property will be called substitutable preferences. "In Roth (1984a) firm and worker-optimal stable outcomes were shown to have a stronger property. Let/ be, say, the firm-optimal stable outcome, and let g be any other stable outcome. Then for any firm j it follows not only diat fjl^gj, but also fj •• Cj(fj U gj). So every firm y is so satisfied by its optimal stable assignment diat it wouldn't choose to modify it by including any elements from its assignment at any other stable outcome.
'^As presented here Model III is not a formal generalization of Models II and I, since the three models have different sets of feasible outcomes. However the analysis of the set of stable outcomes would be unaffected if the models were rewritten with a common set of feasible outcomes, but with agents in the first two models having preferences vrtiich make individually irrational those assignmente that are presently i n f i U e . Cenbin o i e r kinds of feaability constrtunts can also be incorporated into the model in Uiis way.
THEOREM 3 (Consensus property for workers). In Model I let f and g be stable outcomes. There is a feasible stable outcome h defined by A, =» C,(/, U gi)for all i in W, hj = hj for every j in F such that A, C Xii, j) for some i in W, and hj = 0 for all other j in F.
Here the fact that h is feasible means that no two workers choose the same firm. Given the nonemptiness of the set of stable outcomes,'^ these two theorems imply the existence of firm-optimal and worker-optimal stable outcomes, respectively. (That is, part (b) of TTieorem 1 follows in Model I from Theorems 2 and 3.) Every firm, for example, likes the outcome h constructed in Theorem 2 at least as well as both/and g. So, since there can be only finitely many stable outcomes, the firm-optimal stable outcome can be constructed by an iterative process of applying Theorem 2 to its "output" h and any stable outcome which some firm prefers to h, imtil no further such outcomes can be found.
The next two theorems establish that the common interest of the firms is opposed to that of the workers throughout the set of stable outcomes. The common interests of each set of agents define a partial order on the set of stable outcomes (e.g., / is at least as great as g in the ordering defined by the common interests of the firms if and only iifjPjgj or fj » gj for all firms/). The properties of the set of stable outcomes can be formulated in lattice-theoretic terms (cf. Birkhoff 1973). THEOREM 6. In Model I, (a) The set of stable outcomes is a cmnplete distributive lattice under the partial order of the firms' common interests, and also under the partial order of the workers' common interests.
(b) The lattice under one partial order is the dual ofthe lattice under the other partial order.
(c) In either lattice, for any two stable outcomes f and g, the greatest lower bound f A g and the least t^per bound f^g both give every agent on one side of the market his preferred choice of the two outcomes, and every agent tm ttu other sick of tin market his less preferred choice.
PROOF. Theorem 2 establishes that the set of stable outcomes is a join semilattice under the partial order of the firms, and characterizes the least upper bounds (joins), h^'fVg for any pair of stable outcomes / and g. Thewem 3 establish^ the same result for the partial order of the workers, llieorems 4 and S establish that die two partial oilers are duals, so the two semilattices are duals, and constitute a lattice under either partial order. The finiteness of the lattice insures that a great^t lower bound and a least upper bound exist for every set of stable outccHms, so the lattice is complete. To show that the lattice is distributive, it suffices to show / V (g A A) = ( / V g) A (/ V h) for all stable outcomes/, g,h. But for any firm/, if ^ ig A h)) = (g A A) if and only if gjPjf and hjPJj. Otherwise the expression on the left equals j^. Similarly ( ( / V g ' ) A ( / V A))y==(g A A)y if and only if g^Pjfj and hjPJj, and otherwise the expression on the left equals j^. So the lattice is distributive, since this is true for all firms/. This completes the proof.
Since Blair (1982) has shown that every distributive lattice corresponds to the set of stable outcomes for some marriage market, there is no more restrictive lattice structure that can be used to describe stable outcomes here.'* PROOF OF THEOREM 7. First we show that A is a well-defined, feasible outcome. Suppose not: then two different firms must choose the same worker; i.e., there exist a worker / and different firms/ and k such that A contains/ and A, contains g,. Worker / must prefer one of these assignments to the other (since workers have strict preferences): without loss of generality, let/P,g,. But firms have strict preferences, so hjPjgj (since gj ¥= hj), and these preferences are substitutable, so / is contained in C^(^ U / ) (via Lemma 1, since hj contains/). Therefore g would be unstable via i,j and/, contrary to the a^umption. So A must be well defined and feasible.
Polarization of interests in Model
Next we show that h is stable. Since/and g are stable, h is individually rational,'* and so A, » C,(A,) trivially for all workers k and by construction of h for all firms k. Suppose A were not stable. Then the;re is a worker i, a firm/, and a job description Xy in Xii,j) such that x,yP,A, and XyE Cy(A^ U {Xy})Pjhj. (So Xy is not an element of either fj or gj.) But A, equals either / or g . Without loss of generality, let A, = g,. Denote CjiCjihj U {jc^}) U gJ) by ©,. Then VjPjhj, and so Vj is not a subset of hj = CjihJ), so Xy E Vj. But Vj -C,(tj, U gj), so substitutability implies Xy E Cjigj U {xjj}). So f is unstable via i,j, and Xy, which provides the contradiction needed to complete fie proof.
However TTieorem 3 does not extend to this model; i.e., the consensus property for choices by workers between stable outcomes which held in Model I no longer holds in Model II. As tiie following counterexample shows, the problem is not that different workers may choose the same firm, since this is not infeasible in this model. Instead, the problem is that the feasible outcome A resulting from worker choices between two staUe outcomes may not itself be stabte.
Coimerexarrfle II-l. No Consensus Prcq>erty for Workers. Consider tiie case of six workers, FT-{1,2,3,4,5,6}, and five firms, F -{l',2',3',4',5'}. There is exactly one feasible job d»crq>tion for each woiker-firm pair, so Xii,j) = {ij,f)} for all i in W and y in F, so we may regard wwkers' preferences as being defined over firms, and firms' prd^ratces as being defined over sets of workers. It will be sufficient for our purpose to ^)ecify only fee first Xmo or three elements in each agent's preference ordering, whkh may be aclead«i in any sray consistent with the substitutabiiity of the '*Ho«»w«r wiioi agents can be iwWfwent between distinct job descriptions Uiey receive at suble outcome*, it B s t n i^m ' w a n l to «>nstnicl an example showing Aat there need be no lattice structure, m) <=oasen»u ptopisty, aai no c^ttanid staUe oitfctme toe dther set (rf agents.
'^ is, fcM-every agent k, either A, -0 or h^P^Si. Let / and g be the stable outcomes in which the workers matched to each firm are given by Table 1. (That is, in our more general formal notation, / = {(',')} for / = 1 , . . . , 5, /^ = ((6,4')},^.. = {(y,y')} f o r / = l',2',3',5',/4, = {(4,4'),(6,4')}, etc.)
It is easily verified that / and g are both stable. The outcome A is defined by giving each worker / his choice l^tween/ and g: that is A, = C,(/ U g,) for each / in W. Note that firm 1' is left unmatched at A (i.e.. A,. = 0).
To see that the consensus property for workers' choices fails here, note that A is unstable, via workers {2,3,5,6} and firm 1'. Note also that, unlike the case in Model I, the outcome A produced by giving each worker i the assignment / or g, which he prefers cannot be equivalently defined by giving each firm / the assignment fj or gŵ hich he likes least; here that fails to produce even a feasible outcome, since firms 1' and 2' would both include worker 1 in their least preferred choice. (Note that in Counterexample II-l, the worker-optimal stable outcome is the outcome which gives every worker his first choice firm, and the firm-optimal stable outcome gives every firm its first choice assignment of workers.)
We can now consider the extent to which the opposition of the common interests of firms and workers, studied in Theorems 4 and 5, continues to hold in Model II. The phenomenon captured in Theorem 4 persists here: if all workers like one stable outcome at least as well as another, then firms have the reverse preference. This will be proved below, since it will no longer be so in Model III. However the phenomenon captured in Theorem 5 no longer persists: all firms may prefer one stable outcome to another, and some workers may agree. This will be demonstrated in Counterexample II-2. THEOREM 9. In Model II / / / and g are stable outcomes such that fPjgj or / = g, for all workers i, then gjPjfj or gj = fj for all firms j .
PROOF OF THEOREM 9. Suppose the theorem is false: then fjPjgj for some firm y. E)enote by S the subset of woricers 1 such that / C Cjifj U §). If /, = g, for all 1 G 5, then Cjifj U gj) is a strict subset of g^, so g is unstable since gj =^ Cjigj). Otherwise, there is a worker 1 in S such that/=?^g,, so//*,g,. Since firm/ has sulwtitutable preferences. Lemma 1 implies /• C Cjigj U / ) , so g is unstable via *, / and / . The contradiction onnpletes ti^ proof.
The following counterexample shows tiiat TTieorem 5 does not extend to this model. Cmmterexample 11-2. Consider the case of two workers, >F-(1,2), and one firm, F = {1'}. For workers / = 1,2, the set of feasible job descriptions is given by Xii, V) = {(i,$s)| J = 1 , . . . , 10}. The prrferences of worker i -1,2 are ^ven by ''That is, worker I for example lycra firm 2' most ot aU, foBowed by i', and so on.
ii,$s)Pjii,St) if and only if s > t; and (j,$l)i*,0. So worker / prefers higher salaries to lower salaries, and employment to unemployment. The firm's preference relation is given by (a) ((l,$5,) . ( So firm 1' prefers to hire both workers, at as low a total payroll as possible (with a tie-breaking preference for paying worker 1 more than worker 2). If he can't hire both workers even at top dollar, he prefers to hire one worker at the lowest salary possible, with a tie-breaking preference for worker 1, and he prefers to hire one worker, even worker 2 at the highest feasible salary, to remaining unmatched.
It is clear that every outcome which matches both workers to the firm is stable. Let/ be the stable outcome/= {(1,$5),(2,$5)}, which matches both workers to the firm at a salary of $5 each. Let g be the stable outcome g = {(1,$6),(2,$1)}, which matches both workers to the firm at salaries of $6 for worker 1 and $1 for worker 2.
Then the only firm prefers g to/, and so does worker 1. That is, every firm prefers g to /, but it is not the case that every worker likes / at least as well as g. So the preferences of workers and firms are not opposed in the same way as in Model I. This completes the counterexample.
The properties of the set of stable outcomes can be formulated in lattice-theoretic terms as follows. (ii) For any two stable outcomes f and g, the least upper bound f V g gives every firm its choice from its employees at f and g.
PROOF. Theorem 7 establishes that the set of stable outcomes is a join semilattice under the partial order of the firms, with the required least upper bound. It is complete, sin<» it is finite. To prove the theorem it will therefore be sufficient to demonstrate that every subset of stable outcomes has a greatest lower bound. Let S be such a subset, and let LiS) he the set of stable outcomes g such that for a l l / i n S, fjPjgj or fj = gj for all firms/. (That is, L(S) is tiie set of all lower bounds for S under the partial order of the firms.) By Theorem 1, L(5) is nonempty, since it contains the worker-optimal stable outcome. Therefore, since the join semilattice is complete, LiS) has a least upper bound A, which is therefore the greatest lower bound for S. This completes the proof.
As in Model I, the firm and worker-optimal stable outcomes in Model II are the maximum and minimum elements of a lattice ordered by the firms' common interests. However only parts of the lattice structure, and only parts of its explanatory power for Theorem 1, have survived the generalization to Model II. These issues become even clearer in Model III, where workers as well as firms have substitutable preferences.
Pobffizatkm of into«sts in Model III
: Some open questkHis. The consensus property which has supported the lattice structure observed in Models I and II is absent from both sides of tiie market in Model III. Since Model III generalize Model n, it is immediate from Counterexample II-l that the consensus property fails to hold for workers, and since (unlike Model II) Model III treats workers and firms symmetrically, the propel^ also faUs to hold for firms in Model III. Similarly it follows from Counterexample 11-2 that the common interests of workers and firms are not in general opposed throughout the set of stable outcomes, in either direction in Model III.
This leaves us without any natural explanation of why, in the most general of the matching models considered, firm and worker-(q>timal stable outcomes exist, and why the optimal stable outcome for one side of the market is the worst stable outcome for all agents on the other side. That is, although the most general model can be shown to have these properties, only in the more specialized models can these properties be explained in terms of properties of the entire set of stable outcomes, which in tum reflect the preferences of the agents, which constitute the data of the model. Two avenues of further investigation suggest themselves. The first would involve an effort to determine if any lattice properties similar to those studied here survive the generalization to Model III. Note well that what has been shown here is only that the consensus property and opposition of interests do not generalize to Model III. It remains an open question whether the set of stable outcomes might nevertheless always be a lattice, with some suitably defined meet and join. If, for any preferences of the agents, the set of stable outcomes is a lattice, and if the meet and join have a natural interpretation in terms of the choices of the agents (comparable to the interpretation allowed by the consensus property), then a general explanation of the existence of optimal stable outcomes could perhaps be constructed along roughly the same lines as for the more specialized cases.
Alternatively, it may be necessary to explore quite different kinds of structural properties of the set of stable outcomes. For example, the bipartite nature of the matching problem makes it possible to speculate that the set of stable outcomes might possess some matroid properties that would allow the existence of optimal stable outcomes to be explained in terms of the kind of optimization results associated with matroids.
One reason it seems important to understand the cause and extent of the polarization of interests among agents on different sides of a matching problem is that, when such polarization exists, the particular institutions used to resolve a given matching problem may have differential welfare implications for agents on opposite sides of the market. In Roth (1984a) I consider from this point of view tiie sucMssion of institutional procedures by which graduating medical students in the United States have obtained employment by hospitals as interns and residents. The organization of that labor market underwent considerable ttumoil for at least 30 years prior to 1951, at which time a procedure was instituted that employs an algorithm which turns out to yield the ho^tal-optimal stable outcome. Witii small modifuations, that procedure continues to be used to organize the market for interns and residents today.
Note added in proof:
A recent paper by Blair (1984) shows that, for a class of markets differing from Model III only in subtle respects, a lattice structure exists with respect to an appropriate partial order. 
